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INTRODUCTION
Social policy (Sozialpolitik) in Norway is no longer based
only on the needs of the weaker underprivileged or low resource
groups within our society. Under the label of "preventive measures,"
social policy is increasingly concerned with the distribution of
welfare benefits to all strata of the population. New groups are con-
tinually taking advantage of the social services so as to get a share of
the benefits. These groups are not recruited from the lower strata of
society. The problems presented do not stem from general poverty
conditions, and they carry relatively little statistical risk of throwing
the affected individuals into permanent need for support.
There are several reasons for this development that will not be
discussed in this study. It is sufficient to point to the fact that social
benefits during the last few years have to an increasing degree been
used as instruments of general economic policy and as part of the
wage settlements between public authorities and all categories of
wage earners. Rather, we shall be concerned with some of the con-
sequences of this development for low resource groups. Since social
service expenditures cannot increase indefinitely, even in periods of
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economic growth, acquiescence to new demands from one group
necessarily must lead to lessened compliance to the needs of other
groups. At the same time it is still more obvious that low resource
groups cannot successfully compete in the battle for social benefits.
This is apparently an unintentional effect of an imperfect system of
distribution and is often interpreted in relation to characteristics of
the clients preventing them from effecting their demands and the
organizational weakness in a welfare system that is not geared to
meet the needs of groups with low resources.
This is doubtless correct, but we should also consider whether
this failure is not actually consistent with the more general social
principles by which limited goods are distributed. All class so-
cieties set certain limits on how much redistribution can be toler-
ated at any time, and these limits are incorporated in the distribu-
tive social service system in the form of "selective rationing mech-
anisms" directed at certain groups. Some of these mechanisms are
explicit, statutory directives concerning who shall receive and who is
not entitled to public resources. However, other rationing mech-
anisms are implicit and informal, based on broad norms and setting
limits on the redistribution of resources to marginal and deviant
groups.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
We will take the Norwegian system of social security as our
example. There is little research information about this system, its
effects, and its clientele, so we must rely on a number of more gen-
eral observations and on information about bureaucratic organiza-
tions and their relations with low resource groups as our point of de-
parture. The literature in this field is by now quite comprehensive
(see Sheriff 1976; Nisbet 1975; Leibfried 1977; Schaffer and Huang
1975; Sjoeberg, Brymer, and Farris 1966; (jJyen 1974).
The social security system is founded on the National Insurance
Act of 1967. Approximately 6000 people are directly employed in
the organization, and in 1978 it will administer more than 30 billion
kroner. It has functioned in its present form for about a decade, but
most of its provisions are older. The organization is built up in the
form of a classical bmeaucracy with a highly centralized administra-
tion, specialization, departmentalization, hierarchical accountability,
and a complex set of regulations. The system has a monopoly in
administering the benefits granted under the National Insurance Act
such as retirement and disability pensions, health and unemployment
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insurance, family allowances, and so forth. These benefits are not
determined by supply and demand in the market, but by politically
set rates that will cover predefined needs. The benefits and services
that are offered were orginally designed to provide assistance to low
resource groups, but have been expanded to include compensation
for loss of wages in case of unemployment for all categories of work,
social disability in a wider sense, pregnancies, deaths, and the like.
This means that the benefits in principle apply to the entire popu-
lation, and therefore the clientele is drawn from new groups. The
increase in social service expenditures is partly due to the incorpora-
tion of these new groups into the system. Instead of being political
measures for treating social problems, social service benefits are
becoming a more generalized political tool used in wage agreements
and the distribution of goods among people who already have work.
This can be considered a positive development both on welfare prem-
ises and because it builds a bridge between the first and second
class citizens in Norwegian society-that is, those whose income
comes from their own work and those who receive welfare grants.
However, it is not certain that everyone profits equally from this
development. All social systems have a tendency to be influenced by
their public, and the social security system is no exception. As a
larger proportion of the "normal" pu blic begins to use the services
provided by social security, greater emphasis will be placed on
administrative responses to normal behavior.
UNDERCONSUMPTION OF BENEFITS
Many people are in need of welfare benefits but cannot
receive them because regulations do not recognize their needs. This is
an important issue, but not relevant in this context. We pose the
question why so many prople who have acknowledged rights to
welfare benefits do not receive the goods and services they are
entitled to. Underconsumption of welfare benefits may be a greater
social problem than alleged abuse of social services (Rapport 1971;
Utredning 1973).
We know very little about the size of the group that does not get
the benefits to which its members are entitled, but several studies
indicate that underconsumption must be considerable. A study of
the blind and partially sighted, for example, showed that many indi-
viduals receive neither the basic pension to which they were entitled,
nor the most elementary technical aids whose costs are refunded by
the social security system (Odland 1977). A survey in a lower class
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area in Oslo showed that nearly a quarter of the tenants had not
received all the social benefits to which they were entitled (Eskeland
and Finne 1973; Kolberg 1976).
A study conducted by the social security system's own administra-
tion shows a great general need for information concerning rights to
social benefits, and obviously relevant information is necessary
before the public can claim its rights (Lyngstad 1974; Linden 1972).
Other investigations among different types of handicapped groups,
old people, and the poor, both in Norway and elsewhere, give the
same picture of a hidden underconsumption.
The studies uncover four types of underconsumption. First, we
have individuals who have never been in contact with the social
security system and therefore have never received the benefits to
which they are entitled. Second, are those who receive only part of
the benefits for which they qualify. Third, there are those who dis-
cover their rights too late and get help long after they were first en-
titled to it. As a fourth group, we have those whose applications are
incorrectly refused by the system (NOV 1976).
Why is this so? Why are many more people entitled to benefits
than actually receive them? This question has been asked many times
and is usually answered by reference to characteristics associated
with the individual recipients or lack of responsiveness toward the
clients from the service organization. Neither of these two explana-
tions seems to provide a sufficient answer. A more detailed analysis
shows that the social security system is actually constructed with a
number of regulating and rationing mechanisms that are nonstatu-
tory and that necessarily result in a considerable underconsumption.
This is hardly accidental. Some of the rationing mechanisms reflect
common attitudes about living off welfare and not being gainfully
employed. Other rationing mechanisms are an indiTect result of the
way the social security system is organized. The management of
social problems has been delegated to a traditional bureaucracy
without consideration for the specific chaTacteristics of these prob-
lems. Social pro blems have a variety of causes and a highly differ-
entiated clientele, and it is unlikely that an organization that is
created to solve certain kinds of problems will be flexible enough to
solve others. In the following sections we shall take a closer look at
some of the most important rationing mechanisms.
Information Failure as a
Rationing Mechanism
The legal provisions governing the social security system aTe so com-
plicated that there is probably no single individual who completely
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masters the rules for the distribution of benefits. The social insurance
system therefore is organized in a number of departments that ad-
minister different aspects of the law and have a specialized staff.
Internal memoranda, decisions and interpretations are written in a
judicial language that renders them inaccessible to the uninitiated.
This precision of expression is important within a bureaucracy to
ensure correct application of the regulations, but it can be carried
too far.
The law is designed to meet all contingencies, even though some of
them may be very hypothetical and apply to only a few potential
abusers. This results in excessively comprehensive and complicated
regulations which even differ in internal agreement with regard to
basic principles. External interests and compromises a.re reflected
in the welfare system as in other administrative organs. Consider, for
example, the principles for the benefits offered by disability pensions
and occupational disability pensions. These give individuals with the
same degree of invalidity very different rights according to whether
they were injured in accidents at work or in other places. The needs
of the injured do not determine the amount of help that is made
available, while the situation of the employment of the injured and
the place where the accident occurred do. (Compare also the legis-
lation concerning single heads of households, grants of technical aids
to different types of disabled persons, etc.) The regulations are
difficult to read and often completely unintelligible to people who
can neither understand the judicial language nor find the appropriate
paragraphs. The staff in the local social insmance offices master the
common regulations, but complicated cases must be submitted to
higher authorities.
It is maintained that a social insurance official must have four or
five years experience before he or she has sufficient expertise to serve
the ordinary public competently.a This is the background to the
problems facing the official information office when it tries to
inform the public about its rights. The information office is supposed
to communicate to the public a system of regulations that have
become so complicated that neither information experts nor anyone
else can manage to describe it in clear and simple terms.
As it is, the information deals mainly with the basic grants and the
most elementary rights pertaining to them. It seems as if only the
most elementary welfare measures can be presented without reserva-
tions. The information leaflets become evasive and vague when they
aThese figures are not exact, but representatives of the social security system
have suggested, in discussion with social workers concerning the optimal lenr;th
of their education, that four or five years practice is necessary.
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present other social benefits available to the public. This is done in
order to avoid raising false hopes, which is, of course, a praiseworthy
motive. However, it would be more reasonable to admit that it is
impossible to explain the complexity of the social security jungle in a
simple yet truthful way, because it can only be understood by a
small group of specialists.b
The authorities are hesistant to ackowledge these side effects of a
complicated system. They ascribe the ignorance of the public to its
lack of interest in orienting themselves to the system and not reading
the leaflets they frequently receive free of charge in their mailboxes.
It is also suggested that those who need help the most are those who
are slowest to find out about their rights. This is probably true, but it
does not change the basic fact that it is necessary to study the regula-
tions intensively before they become sufficiently understandable to
make use of them.
The staff of the local offices undoubtedly do their best to help the
public, but it is just as difficult for them to simplify the system as it
is for the information office. A small group of lawyers now special-
izes in social legislation and on behalf of their clients track down the
relevant information. This is an important development, but there
are very few of these specialists in comparison to the approximately
200 ,000 new social insurance cases initiated every year. Further-
more, the fundamental problem remains, as the public is not able to
acquire and process the material that is relevant for their welfare
(Kj¢nstad 1975).
The regulatory complexity that was considered necessary to ensure
justice becomes in itself unjust, because it is instrumental in prevent-
ing many people from ever getting the welfare benefits to which they
are entitled. Moreover, it is also instrumental in stigmatizing certain
people as ignorant. It reminds one of the Emperor's new clothes,
since neither Parliament nor the local social insurance boards, who
are supposed to supervise the system, manage to gain insight into the
complex world of the social security system.
Stigmatization as a Rationing Mechanism
Even if everybody knew all about their rights within the social
security system, there would still be many people who would never
b Thcre is no doubt that the National Insurance System is worried about its
failure in the information sector (cr. the most recent volumes of Sosial Trygd).
Detailed plans have been worked out for improving the public information service.
However, all these plans have the present system of regulations as their point of
departure and assume that better technical aids, use of mass media, and enough
public relations experts in the end will make the public understand the regulations.
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claim their rights. This is due to the strong prejudice and stigma-
tization in our society against people who do not manage to live off
their own eamings. There is no corresponding prejudice against
employers who do not employ "second rate" workers. The prej-
udice is not only reflected in the welfare regulations, but also in
the organizational arrangements of these regulations. Certain groups
are stigmatized more than others, and this stigmatization acts as
a rationing mechanism. There are two forms of stigmatization of
people who receive welfare grants. The first type is applied by the
public in general towards different groups of welfare clients and
works independently of the organization of the system. The second
type consists of mechanisms within the welfare system that, inde-
pendent of the intentions of the staff, reinforce the general processes
of stigmatization.
Some situations increase the experience of being stigmatized more
than others. Selective social services, for example, create more stig-
matizing situations than universal social services (Pinker 1971). Situ-
ations where people do not understand the decisions concerning
themselves, where they do not understand the language used, and
where they have to communicate with strangers in order to make
their needs known to an out-of-reach decisionmaking body all
further the experience of being stigmatized. The experience is closely
related to a feeling of powerlessness. Situations where people are
required to supply discreditable information about themselves and
where they must contribute to the reinforcement of a negative
impression of themselves are of the same kind. So are situations that
make people at the bottom of a hierarchy beg for help and those that
imply unilateral transfers.
If we examine the social security system more closely, it is possible
to recognize quite a number of such situations. Most welfare benefits
are grants to which the public is entitled, and they are distributed in
accordance with established criteria. For some grants, detailed in-
formation about the client is decisive in determining whether the
requirements laid down in the regulations are fulfilled. This has the
characteristics of a means test. The client presents his application
without knowing the rules of the game and without knowing what
information is pertinent_ The transaction becomes asymmetrical as
the client stands alone while the staff represent the expertise and the
weight of the whole organization. The organization determines the
role of the client and has the right to decide what information about
the client's life is needed and what informaton shall be defined as
irrelevant.
A5 long as we have a welfare system that is organized as a bureauc-
racy, many of these stigmatizing processes seem unavoidable. But
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some reforms have been suggested. There is, for example, no doubt
that the universal benefits to which the public has an automatic right
and that are granted to everyone regardless of class and position as
long as they fulfill some simple requirements are less stigmatizing
than grants that are means tested. Old age pensions, family allowances
based on the size of the family, and refunding within the heath
service are examples of universal benefits that certainly carry no
stigma.
However, a move toward more universal services must be viewed
against the background of the development described in the begin-
ning of this chapter. Universal services are more costly, and if defined
exclusively as social expenditures, they will, in a period of cutbacks
in welfare budgets, be established at the expense of more needy
groups. If we want to stress the point, we could say that what the
poor gain in terms of decreased stigmatization they lose in terms of
actual benefits.
Secrecy is one of the foundations of stigmatization. More openness
in the social security system might reduce the stigmatization. The
complicated and impenetrable regulations and the professional
secrecy imposed on welfare officers both contribute to the myths of
abuse and immoral clients. The public does not have the insight into
the system to reject stereotypes of welfare clients, and cases of
alleged abuse of welfare benefits are never contradicted because of
professional secrecy. Protection of privacy of the individual is im-
portant and might reduce individual stigmatization. When carried too
far in order to protect the system from public insight and the pro-
fession from public control, secrecy in itself becomes part of the
stigmatization process. Clients collectively might be harmed, because
st.ereotype.s concerning their behavjor are not corrected and because
secrecy implies "abnormal" behavior that has to be hidden from
"normal" society. Their real problems are not explained to the
public, and needed welfare services will not be initiated (Qlyen 1978).
Emphasis on the rights of the public to receive welfare benefits will
also contribute to reducing stigmatization. Since our society is organ-
ized around the idea that all pay is related to work and to having a
job, an emphasis on the role of welfare grants in compensating for
nonexistent jobs could be helpful. In a tightening job market based
on technically trained and younger people, the weak, the old, and
the uneducated are bound to lose out. The price to be paid for this
type of job market is the size of the social security budget. This price
can only be reduced if it is possible to create a job market adjusted
to all types of workers.
The size of the grants offered under the social security system is itself
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an important condition for stigmatization. The grants are small
enough to reinforce the impression that the welfare clients come
from the lower classes of Norwegian society, and poverty tradition-
ally is an invitation to stigmatization. An increase in the minimum
pension would be a good, helpful protection against stigmatization
(cf. Hogan 1977). It is also important to realize that unilateral
exchange will always be stigmatizing, no matter how it is made.
There is no way of repaying the social security system. The client
will a.Jways have to assume the humble and grateful role that the
benefactor expects of the beneficiary.
Built-in Queues as a Rationing Mechanism
There are no price mechanisms in the welfare system that regulate
demand and supply. In principle all consumers are equal, and ideally
it is the need that should determine the form and size of the grants.
Need, however, is an extremely variable phenomenon that grows
parallel to services offered and a rising standard of living. As was
said at the outset, new interest groups continually present their
needs, and new needs are recognized and incorporated into the
system. However, the welfare system does not develop as quickly as
needs are recognized, and therefore queues form at many points
within the system.
Formation of queues acts as a rationing process, because queues
contribute to restricting demand (Bramness and Christiansen 1976).
Position in the queue is not decided purely by chance; neither are
dropouts in the queue random. Those who are active, know the rules
of the game, are able to organize interest groups, and arouse public
opinion will, in all probability, move forward in the queue, while
those who are passive and not able to mobilize either themselves or
others will remain in the queue longest. Individuals or groups who
can procure the same benefits through other channels will obviously
do so and leave the queue. As always, those who have many re-
sources will have the most choices, while those with few resources
stay longest in the queue and are repeatedly pushed back. Moreover,
many individuals will never make any demands because they know
about the length of the queues and therefore give up beforehand.
There are at least two types of queue within the social security
system-those created within the system and those created in social
service agencies lovated outside the system but hooked up with the
social security system through funding and organizational arrange-
ments. The first type of queue is usually considered to be a result of
inadequate staffing in the offices that handle applications. Statistics
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of this kind of delay are carefully kept and used as an argument for
expanding the staff. However, the most important cause for delay is
ignored-namely, the complicated regulations that make detailed
investigation necessary before a decision can be made. It is likely that
the number of experts within the system could be increased consider·
ably without appreciably shortening the queues.
The social security system has less control over the queues formed
in social service agencies outside the system. Many of the delays and
queues are caused by the organization of refunding, however. Under-
consumption is probably large, but is hidden because no systematic
information is provided about how slowly the queues move, how
long they are, and how many clients are referred to other institutions.
Clinics and rehabilitation institutions have long queues that are not
regulated by antecedents. These institutions have inadequate capacity,
and their choice of clients is influenced by their goals of showing
successful treatment. Within the rehabilitation sector, for example,
services are more or less reserved for the most adaptable clients and
those having the best prognoses for getting back to work. Other
services, such as physiotherapy, treatment by specialists, and psy-
chiatric counseling, are also examples of scarce commodities that
people queue up for. Economic compensation for time spent in the
queue is no substitute for treatment, since problems increase as the
months roll by. And the longer the clients have to wait in line, the
further their resources become reduced.
The Passive Bureaucracy as a Rationing Mechanism
The bureaucracy is in many ways an effective form of organization. It
assumes, however, certain qualities in its clients that make it less
suited for handling certain problems in the social service sector. The
public is heterogeneous, without common interests and mostly
unaware of its rights. The traditional clientele also is recruited
from the lower class and often stigmatized before entering the
system. Their demands are socially not fully legitimized and cannot
be enforced as they have no services or production of importance to
society to withhold. As a result, the individual client as well as the
group is in a weak position when dealing with the bureaucracy. It is
hardly an exaggeration to say that the social security bureaucracy has
little need to pay much attention to its clients because they cannot
retaliate. Only through intensive pressure group activity or when
surveys and research throw Ught on the way the system works can
the bureaucracy be forced to change its course.
The rationing mechanisms described above prevent a large number
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of individuals from receiving welfare benefits to which they are
entitled. We can only guess how many people are involved and
who they are. It is not considered the duty of the social security
bureaucracy to ask these questions or to initiate research into the
problem. Its duty is only to i.nfoTI11 the public when asked. It has no
obligation to go out and try to find potential clients.
The social security system pays no attention to research showing
underconsumption; it does not publicize the results, nor does it use
them in the education of future bureaucrats or try to estimate the
size of the underconsumption.
The philosophy of much of the social security system is based on
the premise that active individuals, who know their rights, should
present a clearly formulated application, preferably in writing. When
the client does not come to the social security office, this is inter-
preted as a defect in the client and not in the system. Automatic
registration of new clients who are summoned for information exists
only for old age pensions and some family allowances. The under-
consumption for these benefits is minimal.
Each client is dealt with individually, and at no time are clients
with similar problems brought together. While this is advantageous
for the system, since it needs only to bargain with one individual at a
time, it is disadvantageous for the clients, who do not have a chance
to learn from each other, act jointly, and back each other up against
the bureaucracy. Welfare clients are mostly unorganized, and in the
well-organized Norwegian society, unorganized groups are politically
weak and without influence. It seems important to construct an
organizational structure that furthers the formation of interest
groups among clients with similar problems. At present, it is pri-
marily clients with greater resources and nonstigmatized problems
who manage to form interest groups and achieve advantageous reforms.
However, since the welfare public is heterogeneous, interest groups
would have to be organized in such a way that different groups do not
damage each other's interests while competing for limited resources.
In cases of disagreement between the client and the social security
system the client is more or less left on his or her own. The staff are
assigned the dual role of helping the client appeal the decision and
being loyal to the system whose decision is being appealed. An
independent board of helpers within the social security system would
be a better support for the client in appeal cases. At present, it seems
likely that many rejections are not appealed because the staff do not
believe that an appeal will be successful. Therefore dissatisfaction is
not registered, and we have no statistics on how many cases are
involved. In this connection it is interesting to note that nearly a
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quarter of the appeals made to the court of appeal were decided in
favor of the clients while they were being processed and before
coming to court (NOV 1976). This means that when given a chance
the system corrects its own mistakes. Elsewhere the social security
system is responsible for providing free legal help for some of the
clients who appeal a decision. (This is a new statute in Israeli Social
Security Law, which was enacted in the fall of 1977.)
IS RATIONING NECESSARY?
It seems to be important to ask what the functions are of
these rationing mechanisms. Are they unintentional or intentional,
and what would happen, in our society and in our welfare system, if
they were removed?
Norway is a welfare state whose social security system is consid-
ered worthy of imitation by other countries. The National Insurance
Act is a banner of considerable pride, because it contributes to
increasing the standard of living and quality of life of many Norwe-
gians. Our pride has, however, prevented us from admitting the
existence of flaws in the system and has encouraged us to conceal a
tendency to favor high resource groups and to discriminate against
low resource groups. This is perhaps not surprising. The social
security system operates within the society that created it; and
Norwegian society being a class system, goods are unequally dis-
tributed and mechanisms are at work to preserve and even increase
the inequalities ((fJyen 1976).
The hierarchical pecking order is closely connected with the dis-
tribution of power within the society, and the social security system
does not try to challenge the power hierarchy as it might if it strength-
ened the position of the poor, organized them, and ensured that they
received all the benefits to which they were entitled. It remains
"neutral," though its neutrality is tinged with middle class sympathies
and flawed because it has greater loyalty to other bureaucracies than
to its lower status clients. The rationing mechanisms become another
tool to reinforce the existent inequalities in our society, although the
National Insurance Act is designed as a tool to promote our beliefs in
equality and just distribution of common goods.
The rationing mechanisms also have economic consequences that
should not be ignored. If these mechanisms were to be eliminated,
and everyone received benefits due under the law, it would have
drastic consequences for the social security budget. Expenditures
would rise so sharply that an extraordinary parliamentary grant would
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be necessary. Opposition to the increased social security expenses
would surely grow among the general public and demands would be
set forward that no further increases should occur and that transfer
of benefits to new groups should imply deductions in benefits for
other recipients within the system. It is difficult to guess what
principles would be used to decide priorities if the welfare budget
should be reduced, but an explicit priority system, which we do not
now have, would undoubtedly be introduced. A reevaluation of
the social security system would be painful and disruptive, because it
would involve defining om views on the future position of the poor
in our society and would stress the concept of class in the social
policy discussion. On the whole, there has been political agreement
about our present social policy, and it is unlikely that the reform we
can realistically expect will primarily deal with the rationing mechan-
isms that have been discussed above. It is more likely that resources
available to the system will be spread thinly and that the social
security bureaucracy, with its 6000 employees, has so much mo-
mentum that it will continue in its present path with very few
changes.
Since this was written, a government-appointed committee con-
cerned with welfare benefits has delivered its report. It suggests that
the minimum pension should be raised by 40 percent in the course of
five years. It will be interesting to see whether or not this interest
group, mobilized to represent a low resource group, will be successful
and even more interesting to see which demands from high resource
groups will be presented to compete with this increase.
